Low-Wage Employment Subsidies in a Labor Turnover Model of the 'Natural Rate' by Hoon, Hian Teck & Phelps, Edmund S.
Low-Wage Employment Subsidies in a
Labor-Turnover Model of the 'Natural Rate'
by
Hian Teck Hoon, National University of Singapore
Edmund S. Phelps, Columbia University
November 1996
Discussion Paper Series No. 9697-05
Low-Wage Employment Subsidies in a
Labor-Turnover Model of the 'Natural
Rate'
HIAN TECK HOON




* Department of Economics and Statistics, National University of Singapore, 10, Kent
Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260, Tel: (65) 772-6015, Fax: (65) 775-2646, and Depart-
ment of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Tel: (212) 854-2060, Fax:
(212) 854-8059, respectively.
Abstract
This paper studies two kinds of wage subsidy in a model of the natural
rate having a continuum of workers ranked by their productivity—a
flat wage subsidy and a graduated wage subsidy, each program fi-
nanced by a proportional payroll tax. We show that in the model's
small open economy version, both subsidy schemes expand employ-
ment throughout the distribution; for those whose productivity is
sufficiently far below the mean, take-home pay is unambiguously up,
though the tax financing lowers take-home pay at the mean and above.
For any particular class of workers paid the same amount of the wage
subsidy under the two plans, the graduated plan expands employment
more. In the closed-economy case, the interest rate is pulled up, and
employment is increased for workers whose productivity levels are be-
low or equal the mean. A hiring subsidy is also studied. (JEL E24,
H22)
Key words: Natural rate of unemployment, low-wage employment subsidy.
There is considerable agreement that the extraordinarily low commercial
productivity of active-age persons in the lower reaches of the distribution rel-
ative to median productivity is the number one social problem of our time.
In creating a huge wage gap it makes the less productive incapable of sup-
porting a family or in some cases themselves (in a way meeting community
standards of decency at any rate) and having access to mainstream commu-
nity life. In reducing the wage incentives that private enterprise can afford
to offer low wage workers relative to their other resources and attractions, it
worsens unemployment and nonparticipation. Both sets of effects operate in
turn, especially in areas where there is a high concentration of these effects,
to increase dependency on welfare and property crime, spread drug use and
violence, widen illegitimacy and blight the upbringing of children (Freeman,
1996; Murray, 1984; Phelps, 1994b; Wilson, 1996.)
There is far less agreement on what, if anything, would be useful to do
about it. An important line of thinking, however, looks to wage subsidies of
one kind or another. The pioneers were Arthur Pigou (1933) and Nicholas
Kaldor (1936), who sought the conditions for employment subsidies to be self-
financing. Targeted hiring subsidies were championed by Daniel Hamermesh
(1978), Michael Hurd and John Pencavel (1981) and by Robert Haveman
and John Palmer (1982). The employment-expanding effects of a constant
employment subsidy were studied by Richard Jackman and Richard Layard
(1986). One of us argued informally for a graduated employment subsidy
to raise low-end wage rates (Phelps, 1994a) and to reduce unemployment
(Phelps, 1994b) as a counterweight to the welfare system. Employment sub-
sidies were urged to counter the effects of payroll taxes by Jacques Dreze
and Edmond Malinvaud (1994). A hiring subsidy targeted at the long-term
unemployed has been championed by Dennis Snower (1994). Christopher
Pissarides (1996) has studied employment-tax reflief, which is apt to have a
still different character.
These analyses focus on the subsidies' near-term effects. None of the pa-
pers expressly argues that there would be a permanent effect on unemploy-
ment. Some of the authors may have thought the effect was only temporary
but a way to buy valuable time. To study the long-term effects, however,
requires an intertemporal model in which workers accumulate wealth and
firms invest in capital of one or more kinds according to expectations of the
future and interest rates.
The present paper analyzes some wage subsidies in the steady state in
our labor-turnover model of the natural rate (Phelps, 1968, 1994c; Hoon
and Phelps, 1992, 1996). In this theory, quitting by employees poses an
incentive problem for the firm, since it must invest in the firm-specific training
of workers to make them functioning employees and such an investment is
lost whenever an employee quits. The problem prompts firms to drive up
the going wage. This leads in turn to involuntary unemployment in labor-
market equilibrium. Our 1992 paper posited worker-savers in overlapping
cohorts to obtain a general-equilibrium framework with which to endogenize
the rate of interest or the accumulation of net foreign assets. The present
paper introduces a continuum of workers differentiated by productivity in
each cohort.
We mainly study two employment-subsidy programs offering tax credits
to bona-fide firms for every employee earning a qualifying wage: first, a flat
(constant) subsidy and, next, a graduated subsidy that decreases with the
wage rate and vanishes at the top—each program financed by a flat-rate
payroll tax (as if no reflow of budgetary savings and revenue gains resulted).
The gist of our findings can be indicated. The impact of both subsidies,
of course, is to reduce the hourly labor cost to firms of employing those
workers bringing in a subsidy—all workers under the flat subsidy, low-wage
workers under the graduated plan. Given net wealth and the interest rate,
this operates to reduce the unemployment rates of those workers and to
pull up their wage rates. On the other hand, in the same "short run," the
financing via a flat-rate payroll tax operates to reduce the after-tax pay rates
of all employees and to increase their unemployment rates. At the low end
of the scale, where the tax will be much smaller than the subsidy, the net
results are a rise in the after-tax wage and a rise in employment—wealth and
interest held constant.
The long-run question in the open-economy case is the effect of wealth
adjustment. Won't the workers whose employment and wage are increased
accumulate more wealth, sending their propensity to quit higher, thus weak-
ening firms' demand for their labor, until their unemployment rate is back
to its previous equilibrium level? We show that wealth decumulation serves
to eliminate all the employment declines brought by the tax while wealth ac-
cumulation operates to moderate the gains to employment. The net result,
then, is that employment is increased throughout the distribution.
The long-run question in the closed-economy case is the subsidies' effect
on the rate of interest and the effect in turn on wages and employment. Here
we find that if the labor demand curve is elastic, aggregate wealth supply is
increased, but it increases by less than the increase in asset demand. The
result is a rise in the rate of interest. However, for workers whose productivity
levels are below or equal the mean, employment is expanded; at productivities
far enough below the mean, take-home wages will rise.
It is also found that the graduated scheme, besides having (for the same
subsidy rate at the bottom) a lighter budgetary burden than the constant
subsidy, has an extra downward impact on hourly labor cost, as firms mod-
erate wage rates above the bottom to win a larger subsidy, with the result
that employment receives an extra boost. Such an effect raises the fear that
some middle-wage workers would see their wage reduced on balance. We
show, however, that unless the subsidy tapers off too fast no such wage effect
occurs. Finally, the effects of a hiring subsidy are briefly examined.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the basic features of
the economy having a continuum of workers. Section II studies the incidence
of the subsidies in the steady-state, general-equilibrium model of the small
open economy while Section III studies the closed-economy case. Section IV
concludes.
I. Basic Features Of The Economy
In each cohort, the workers form a continuum when ranked by their respective
potential productivity levels. The productivity, or ability, of worker input
at location i in this continuum is measured by a labor-augmenting, hence
Harrod-neutral, parameter denoted A,. There is a known and unvarying
distribution of A,- in the working population, which we normalize to one. The
proportion of workers with productivity level At or less is F(A{). We assume
that F is differentiate, so that there is a density function for productivity
levels, /(Az) = F'(Ai). We call a worker with productivity level A; a type-i
worker.
The price paid by consumers and received by firms is set equal to unity.
The real household wage received by a type-i worker is denoted v^. Then, if
the ad valorem payroll tax rate is r, and the subsidy for a type-z worker is
Si, the hourly labor cost to the firm of a type-i worker is v( = (1 + r)v^ — st-.
Under the flat or specific subsidy scheme, Si equals sF and hence v^ =
(v{ + -sF)/(l -f T). Under a graduated scheme, Si is a decreasing function
of the wage paid by the firm to each type-z worker, v{. We choose to write
Si = S{v{) such that S'(v{) < 0 and \S'{v{)\ < 1.
There are many identical firms. For convenience we may think of them
as fixed in number (normalized to one) and equal in size. Consider the
representative firm j . Its problem is to choose the wage and hiring-training
policies that maximize1
/•CO fOO
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which is the present value of the stream of real quasirents, subject to
and given Njio. Note that s; is implicit in v^ and uj,-, given r. (Since to sim-
plify we will later work with constant marginal training cost, we also assume
that hjn is bounded, 0 < hjn < h.) Here A is the minimum productitiv-
ity level, Nja is the stock of type-z employees at the representative firm j
taken as a ratio to the type-z workforce (equivalently, the rate of employment
among type-z workers, that is, the ratio of employed type-z workers to the
total number of type-z workers), $(/iJtt) is the fraction of their working time
type-z employees devote to training new hires, hja is the gross hiring rate of
new type-z recruits, ( similiarly measured is the quit rate, rt is the instanta-
neous rate of interest, 6 is the mortality rate, z^te is a proxy for the expected
value of real wage earnings of a type-z worker employed at firm j if he quits,
and yft is the average income from wealth.2
Setting ${hjit) = (3hjit where /?, the marginal training cost in manhours,
is a constant, we may write the current-value Hamiltonian as
{Adi - /%,] - vliit + qj,t[h]tt - C(*S7t&,!#/«&)
1
 Using the notation NJH — LiNju where L,- = /(A,) is the fixed workforce of type-i
workers (the total workforce being normalized to one), the problem solved by firm j could
also be re-expressed as: Maximize f£° J^° Njit{Ai[l — $(/ij,()] — ujit}exp~ Jo T" " dAidt
subject to NJH = Njit[hjit - C(zue/tfn,yit/tfit) ~ &] g i v e n ^;»o- Since all firms are equal
in size and the total number is normalized to one, employment at the representative firm
j , NJH, equals (1 — Uit)Li, where u l t is the fraction of type-i workforce that is unemployed.
2The quit rate function has the following first derivatives: £i > 0 and £2 > 0. By
virtue of the firm's second-order condition for maximization, £n > 0 and £22 > 0- We also
make the assumption that an increase in the nonwage income raises a worker's marginal
propensity to quit with respect to wage prospects elsewhere, that is, £12 > 0.
where q^t is the co-state variable.3 It measures the shadow value of a type-
i worker after training by the employer. First-order necessary conditions
(which are also sufficient under our assumptions) are given by:
{ hjit = h if qjit > A,-/?;hjn = 0 _ if qjit < Ai/3;hJtt E [0,/i] iiqjit = Atf3;
Vjit Vjit UVjit
(3) qjit ~ rtqJit = -[(At- - vfJtt) -
Vjit Vjit
(4) Urn exp-/o ^ <^ tA^/(A t) = 0.
j—-+OO
The equations represented by (1) characterize the optimal number of new
hires. In the case arising in the steady-state analysis below, the shadow value
of a trained worker is equal to the marginal training cost in output terms.
Equation (2) gives the optimal real wage-turnover cost trade-off, equating the
marginal cost of raising v{ to the marginal benefit. Equation (3) relates the
shadow value of functional employees to the total marginal benefit of having
one more employee. The transversality condition is in (4). These equations
summarize the conditions that have to be satisfied for the typical firm.
To move to the equilibrium conditions, we use the Salop-Calvo approxi-
mation for 2;fe,
(5) 4 e = A>.T-
(Using instead the exit rate from the unemployment pool would not differ
in the steady state.) On any equilibrium (correct-expectations) path with
identical firms, Vjit = v^t = v^te and NJH = 1 — ua = Na = N?t. Hence
we obtain a subsystem of equations in the equilibrium path of the economy.
}The flow of output at firm j is then given by fA A,[l — {3hjit]Njitf(Ai)dAi.
For any exogenously given path of the instantaneous real interest rates, this
subsystem is
(6) qit = quiaNu, ffi + 0 + r j - [At - v{t];
(7) N-* — NAh* -
(8) Nlt{-l+qtt[-
vit vi'f dv-t
The nonwage income-wage ratio per type-z worker, y^/v^, can be written
(rt + 0)Wit/v!?t where Wa is the nonhuman wealth per type-i worker, 0Wa
being the actuarial dividend. Note that 0 is the probability of death in
the Blanchard-Yaari set-up adopted here. In the small open economy case,
IA° Witf(Ai)dAi = fj^lqitNit + Fa]f(Ai)dAi where Fa is the amount of net
foreign assets held per type-z worker whereas in the closed-economy case,
Using the Blanchard-Yaari demographic set-up, and assuming that all
workers have identical rate of time preference and mortality rate, and adopt-
ing the log utility function, we obtain an equation for the motion of real
consumption expenditure per member of the type-z workforce, C,t,
(9) Ctt = (rt^p)Ctt-6(p + 0)WtU
where p is the rate of time preference.
In the small open economy case, the path of the domestic interest rate
conforms to the exogenously given world interest rate, r*:
(10) rt = r*, r* a constant > 0.
The level of net external assets adjusts endogenously to bring about this
condition. In contrast, in the closed-economy case, the interest rate is en-
dogenous, reaching the level that equates the demand for "capital" to wealth
supply.
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II. Incidence In The Open Economy
Steady-state Conditions
In steady-state, Nn = 0. This and (7) give the steady-state employment
(SSE) condition that hires balance quits and mortality:
(11) ht = ((Nt,^) + 9.
This implies that <&• = A,-/3.
With qit = 0 in (6) and qi — A,/?, the zero-profit (ZP) condition that
quasirents cover interest and depreciation on training becomes
(12) A,--t;/ = A i/?[C(W,^) + r ' + 0],
where by (10) r* is substituted for the domestic interest rate or, dividing (12)
throughout by A,-,
(12') 1 - | - J
Next, the Blanchard-Yaari set-up and (10) again require
(13) r = p -j- j— .
This condition is obtained by noting that in steady-state, with Ca = 0, (9)
and (10) give r* = p+[0(0+p)Wi/Ci\. Then, using C, = (e+p)[Hi+Wi\ where
Hi is human wealth, and noting that in the steady state Hi = v^Ni/(r* + 9)
and y™ = (r* + 0)Wi, we obtain (13). This relationship gives us a constant-
interest RR curve.
Finally, assuming that the employment rate is always strictly positive, we
obtain from (8) the incentive wage (IW) condition:
or, dividing throughout (14) by A
(14')
Equations (12'), (13) and (14') give us three equations in the three un-
knowns: u/, N{ and y™ /v1?.4 From (13), we can express
yV
(15) ^ = y(r*-p,Ni); *x > 0, #2 > 0.
Substituting into (12'), we obtain a reduced form zero-profit condition:
(16) 1-Vf-
whose slope is given by
d(v{/h.)
ZP
Further substituting (15) into (14'), we obtain a reduced form incentive-wage
condition
- p, Ni))Ni + C2 W , *(r* - p, Nt))V(r* - pt Nt)}
(17)
dv^/dvjr
Suppose that initially the ad valorem payroll tax rate is zero and the
subsidy is also zero. (In that case, with r = s* = 0, v{ is identically equal to
v!f.) Equation (16) can be represented as a downward-sloping demand wage
schedule while (17) can be depicted as an upward-sloping wage curve in the
4Given r and s,-, v^(dv^fdvj) * can be expressed as a function of vf. Also, note that
once the equilibrium values of Ni and yf /v^ are determined, substitution into (11) gives
the equilibrium rate of hiring in steady state, h{.
Marshallian plane shown in Figure 1. Examining (13), and recalling that
in the absence of the tax-subsidy scheme vf = u/, notice that we can also
draw a family of hyperbolas in Figure 1 with each hyperbola lying north-east
corresponding to a higher level of yf. Note also that when the ZP curve
cuts the hyperbola from below, as we have drawn in Figure 1, the labor-
cost elasticity of labour demand is implied to exceed one. (In that case, as
we shall see, the proportionate increase of JVt- effected by the subsidy exceeds
the proportionate decrease of v{/A,- that the increased iV, induces so that, on
balance, the product {v[ jK{]N{ is up.) The derivative immediately following
(16) gives the slope of the demand wage schedule, which depends on how
sensitive the quit rate function is to a change in the economy-wide rate of
employment. If we accept that, in the equilibrium steady-state scenario we
are considering, the quit rate does not vary much with movements in the
employment rate, the zero-profit curve will be somewhat flat, that is, the
labor-cost elasticity of labor demand will be high5. We also notice that the
same diagram (Figure 1) represents the equilibrium for every type-2 worker.
The employment rate, 7Vt, real effective wage, v{/A», and the nonwage income
taken as a ratio to productivity level, y^/At-, are the same for every type-z
worker so the real wage, v{, is twice as high for a worker who is twice as
productive as another worker.6 The nonwage income, yf, corresponding to
the hyperbola passing through Eo, is also twice as high for a worker who is
twice as productive as another worker.
5For the United States over the period 1931-62, Eagly (1965) obtains an estimate of the
elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the unemployment rate that is equal to —0.634.
6The equalization of unemployment rate result depends on the assumption that the
marginal training cost in manhours, (3, is the same across all types of workers. If we have
/?,• > /3j, then it can be shown that the unemployment rate for type-z workers will be higher
than that for type-j workers. Note that this assumption is consistent with A,-/?,- < AjPj,
that is, although the marginal training cost for type-i workers is higher when measured in
manhours, it could be lower when measured in terms of output.
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Fiat subsidy
Since the proportional payroll tax leads to declines in employment and take-
home wages, hence working against the expansionary effects of the subsidy,
it may seem that the net effects are uncertain. We show, however, that
in our long-run model employment unambiguously expands throughout the
distribution; and take-home pay is increased for a worker whose productivity
is sufficiently far below the mean.
With a flat subsidy, recall that v^ = (v{ + sF)/(l + T). Hence, with
; = 1/(1 + r) , we write the incentive-wage condition in (17) as
W , *(r* - p, Ni))Ni + C2 W , *(r* - P, ^ ) ) * ( r * - p, Nt)]
whose slope is given by
dN{
h + Ci2*jW; + Ci + C21* + (22*2* + (2*2] > 0.
Raising the common ad valorem payroll tax to finance a flat subsidy
leaves the zero-profit curve given by (16) unshifted in the iV,—(u//A,-) plane
but shifts down the wage curve given by (18) vertically downward by sF/A,-.
The result is that employment unambiguously expands for workers of any
type-1. Notice also that the before-payroll-tax wage paid out on each type-z
worker, (ujf/A,-) + (sF/Ai), accordingly rises. Mathematically, the effects of
an increase in (sF/A t) on (i?//A,-) + (sF/At) and JVt- are given, respectively, by
<*[(«//A,0 + (sF/ A,-)] r,ZP
d(sF/Ax)
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where rjZP and 7/IW are the elasticities of the zero-profit curve and incentive-
wage curve, respectively. When the zero-profit curve is relatively flat, each
percent increase in sF/A; has a large effect on the before-payroll-tax wage
paid out on each type-z worker as well as a large employment-creating effect.
When the zero-profit curve is horizontal, the worker's before-tax wage is
raised by the full amount of the subsidy.
Inspecting (16) and (18), we see that the common ad valorem payroll tax
rate does not appear. Thus, r has no effect on v{ and N{ for workers of
any type i in the long run. Why is this so? The reason is that although in
the "short run" (when nonwage income is given) a rise in r alone, in low-
ering the demand wage by more than the supply wage, lowers each 7Vt, the
downward adjustment of nonwage income resulting from wealth decumula-
tion completely neutralizes the effects of r on v{ and N{ in the long run.
(Of course, the effect of the subsidies, holding the tax rate constant, would
cause wealth accumulation. We show in the next subsection that this wealth
accumulation does act to moderate employment gains but not to eliminate
them.)
We can also see that, with the same dollar amount of wage subsidy given
to each type-i worker, a less productive worker enjoys a higher subsidy rela-
tive to his productivity level. In Figure 2 we show that the employment effect
is larger for a less productive worker as his wage curve is shifted further down
than that of a more productive worker.7
An important question to ask is how the tax-subsidy scheme affects the
take-home wage of each type-z worker, v^ = (v{ + sF)/(l + T)- As we have
shown, the value (v{ + sF) unambiguously rises for workers of any type i.
To see how the scheme affects vf for each type-i worker, an alternative char-
acterization of the equilibrium that plots the worker's take-home wage, vf,
Mathematically,
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against the employment rate, TV,-, is instructive. The demand wage schedule
in this plane is written as
(19) (1 + T > ? = A,{1 - 0[C(Ni, *(r* - p, Ni)) + r* + 0]} + sF,
while the incentive-wage schedule is now written as
(20) WlhiNi, *(r* - p, Ni))Ni + (2(Ni, *(r* - p, J
We show in Figure 3 an example of a flat subsidy applied to a worker whose
At- is sufficiently below the mean level, Amean = f™ At/(A,)c?A,-, that after-tax
wage is increased. The effects of the tax-subsidy scheme can be decom-
posed diagrammatically into two separate movements. First, the effect of
the common ad valorem payroll tax is to shift both the ZP curve and IW
curve vertically downward to the same extent8. Second, the ZP curve shifts
vertically up on account of the sF term in (19).
Under a balanced-budget policy, the following relationship holds:
/•oo yoo
(21) / s'NifiAJdAi = / Tv}Nif(Ai)dAi.
As we noted earlier, around an equilibrium with no tax-subsidy, Ni is equal
for every type i. It follows that (21) can be simplified to
(22) r = - £ - ,
where f^ ean = JX° vf/(A,)o?At-. For an employee whose A,- < Amean, the tax
liability [rv^) is therefore less than the subsidy (sF). Hence the second (up-
ward) shift will dominate the first (downward) shift of the ZP curve for a
worker whose productivity level, A,-, is below the mean; and vice versa for
8This shift of the two curves corresponds to the result noted earlier that in the long
run, vj and Ni are independent of r.
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Aj above the mean9. For A, sufficiently below Amean, vf is increased. To see
this, use (22) in (19) to obtain
Taking the derivative of v^ with respect to sF in (23), and evaluating at
sF = 0, we have
S^=0 mean
However, noting that
ds* A,-/3[2(Ci + (2*2) + (Cn + CMK + (C21
and that around a zero-subsidy equilibrium, (^f/^ean) = (Ai/Amean), we
finally obtain
where
0 < (d + (2^2) + (Cn + (12^2)^,- + (C21 + (22^2)^ < 1
Examining (24), it is clear that for a worker whose At- is sufficiently low,
say A,- —• A —• 0, the derivative of v^ with respect to sF is unambiguously
positive. But employment is expanded everywhere, as found earlier.
9At the original Ni = Nio, the net vertical shift of the ZP curve is calculated by
taking the derivative of (19) after substituting for r using (22) to yield: dvji/dsF
 3p_Q =
1
 - (WVt&ean)- Evaluated at the zero-subsidy equilibrium, (v/7v£eM) = (v//v£ean) =
(A,/Amean), where the first equality uses the result that with balanced budget, u£ean =
vLea.n' while the second equality uses the demand wage relation and the result that £ is
equal across all types of workers around a zero-subsidy equilibrium. Hence this derivative
is positive for A,- < Amean.
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Note that a sort of wedge- analysis can be used if we juxtapose the wage
curve expressed in terms of (1 + T)V^ in (20) and the zero-profit curve in
(16) in terms of v{. Then the subsidy drives a wedge between these curves,
implying that employment is unambiguously increased and v\ is increased
for small A,-.
Characterization in terms of iso-y™ curves
To contrast the "short-run" and the long-run effects of the tax-subsidy scheme,
we now conduct our analysis in terms of the iso-y^ ZP, iso-y™ IW and iso-y™
RR curves. By proceeding in this manner, we are able to highlight the role
played by wealth or correspondingly, nonwage income, in the adjustment to
the tax-subsidy scheme in the small open economy. We show that wealth
accumulation does operate to moderate the gains to employment and wages
achieved in the "short run" but not to eliminate those gains in the long run.
Using the relationships v{ = (1 + T)V\ — SF and v^dv^/dvj)'1 =
with a flat subsidy, (12) and (14) can be re-expressed, respectively, as
(25) (1 + T)V? = At{l - |
(26) (1 + T)V\ =
In these terms, (25) and (26) give two equations relating v!f to N{ for given
yf. In the JVt-—v^  plane, we can derive a set of iso-t/f zero-profit (ZP), iso-y™
incentive-wage (IW) and iso-y™ constant interest (RR) curves10. The iso-y™
RR curve is given by (13).
Around the equilibrium, we obtain
'.w l..h\ ~~ ~\~\T)
ZP (I +
10The iso-y^ ZP and \so-yf IW curves are related to, but are distinct from, the reduced-
form ZP and reduced-form IW curves used in the previous subsection.
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and so the iso-y™ zero-profit curve is negatively-sloped in this plane.11 The
slope of the iso-y™ incentive-wage curve is
which is positive. Finally, we note from the Blanchardian equation, (13), that
we can express an iso-interest curve denoted RR in Figure 4 as a rectangular
hyperbola. Its slope is given by
v
RR l
Consider an initial situation in the absence of the tax-subsidy scheme.
Figure 4 shows that, initially, the three iso-y™ curves intersect at a point
E012. (This point is drawn to correspond to Eo in Figure 3.) What is the
effect of introducing a flat subsidy financed by a common flat rate payroll
tax? At the initial level of yf, inspection of (25) and (26) reveals that the
iso-y™ ZP and iso-y™ IW curves are shifted away from point Eo. (Inspection
of (13), however, reveals that the \so-y™ Blanchardian RR curve does not
shift at the initial level of y™.) For a worker of type-i whose productivity
level is sufficiently below the mean, the new intersection point between the
iso-yt^ ZP and iso-y™ IW curves occurs at a point to the northeast of point
Eo, namely point E\—a sort of Marshallian "short run" where wealth is held
constant13.
11
 We have used the result that at the equilibrium, the denominator can be simplified
using the relationship describing the incentive-wage condition, re-expressed as (1 + r)vf —
A,-^C2(y?'A?) = AI-/9Ci^.
12Notice that around an equilibrium, the derivatives dv*/dNi\Zp and dv^/dN{\KR de-
scribing the slopes of the iso-yf ZP and iso-yf RR curves, respectively, are equal.
13At the original Nw, and evaluated around the initial zero-subsidy equilibrium, we
obtain the algebraic vertical shift of the iso-yj" ZP curve as dv*/dsF\aF=Q = v*[l -
(^AmeaiJHAt/^Ci-Ni]"1, which is positive for A,- < Amean. A similiar calculation for
the iso-yy IW curve yields dv?/dsF\sF=0 = -(w?/wiLn){l + A,-/?[Ci2JV.- +
&](y?/^f2)}"1' which is negative for each type i worker.
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Long-run general equilibrium is then restored by an upward adjustment
of yf as the workers, rinding their human wealth increased, raise their sup-
ply of nonhuman wealth. From (13), it is apparent that, at any given A ,^
and in particular at 7Vt-0, a one-percent increase in y™ leads to a one-percent
increase in t?-1. In the Appendix, we show, however, that a one-percent in-
crease in yf shifts up the IW curve in the N{—v£ plane by less than one
percent. (The rise of the nonwage income relative to the wage increases the
effectiveness of raising the wage to combat quitting. So the optimal incentive
wage rises. However, it rises by less than the proportion by which nonwage
income rises due to the diminishing marginal effectiveness of the incentive
pay in combatting quitting.) This result implies that the long-run capital
market equilibrium as well as labor market equilibrium can be restored only
at an employment rate above Nio. If the subsidy were proportional, and only
then, the subsidy would be neutral like the proportional tax. At the same
time, the rise of y™, shifts down the iso-y™ ZP curve as the demand wage is
reduced on account of the rise in the quit propensity. This downward shift
of the ZP curve acts in conjunction with the above mentioned upward shift
of the IW curve to cause a fall in TV, relative to the "short-run" level denoted
Nh in Figure 4. Hence the upward adjustment of nonhuman wealth does act
to moderate the gains to employment achieved in the "short run" but not
to eliminate those gains in the long run. In Figure 4, we show that the new
post-tax-subsidy long-run equilibrium point settles at Ei, which corresponds
to point Ei in Figure 3, with both Ni and v£ raised for the low-A, worker.
What is the effect of the tax-subsidy policy on the aggregate supply of
wealth in the small open economy? To reach an answer, we note that an ex-
pression for the average supply of wealth per member of the type-z workforce
is obtained by substituting yf = (r* + 0)W{ in (13):
(27) W{ =
v ;
 >* + V/LV + p-r*
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As argued in Blanchard (1985), if r* were larger than 0 + p, so that r* — p > 0,
individual consumption would increase at a rate higher than the rate of death;
and aggregate consumption would therefore increase forever. To have a well-
defined steady state, we exclude this case.
Using (27), the aggregate supply of wealth can be expressed as
(28) W = f wnWAi = l ^ ^ - ^ ^ ] f ^,/(A,)<iA,.
But since v{ = (1 + T)V^ — sF, budget balance implies
v}Nif(Ai)dAi =
(29) / TvlNifiAJdAi - / s'NifiAJdAi = 0.
•'A -'A
Using (29) in (28), we get
(30) w = [^
Around the zero-subsidy equilibrium, v(/At- and A^,- are identical across
all types of workers. Thus, (30) can be re-expressed as
When the labor-cost elasticity of labor demand exceeds unity, the tax-subsidy
policy raises (v{/Ai)Ni for all type-z workers14. Consequently, the aggregate
supply of wealth is increased.
To determine how the tax-subsidy scheme affects the small open econ-
omy's net external asset position, note that the total value of net external
14In terms of Figure 2, observe that the hyperbola passing through the post-subsidy
intersection point between the IW and ZP curves is to the north-east of the original
hyperbola.
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assets is given by the difference between the aggregate supply of wealth and
the total value of domestic assets (which consists here of domestic "capital"):
(32) / Fif(Ai)dAi = W- At(3Ntf(At)dAt.
Suppose that the small open economy is initially neither in a net creditor
nor net debtor position. It is apparent that the tax-subsidy policy, through
raising N{ and the product (u//A,-)Aft-, raises both W and the second term
on the righthand side of (32). However, it raises the second term of the
righthand side of (32) by more. Consequently, the small open economy's
net foreign asset position moves from zero to negative as a result of the
tax-subsidy policy15.
That the economy ends up in a net debtor position in the new steady-state
can be explained as follows: The tax-subsidy scheme generates an increase of
total consumption demand, fueled by the higher expected earnings of workers.
But consumption supply is not increased as much since each employee devotes
a larger fraction of his time to training rather than production activity as
a result of the tightening of the labor market. A decrease of net external
assets (increased overseas debt) serves to trim consumption demand and
boost consumption supply to reequate the two.
Graduated wage subsidy
With a graduated wage subsidy scheme, uj = (v{ + S(v{))/(1 + T) where
S'(v{) < 0 and |5'(u/)| < 1. Hence, with dv}/dv{ = (1 + S'(v{))/(1 + r) , we
write the incentive-wage condition as
P[b(Ni, V(r* - p, N{))Ni + (2{Nt, ${r* - p, 1
(33) =4^L
15
 When the labor-cost elasticity of labor demand is less than one, the aggregate supply
of wealth would actually fall. The tax-subsidy scheme would then lead to an even larger
decline in the net foreign asset position.
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whose slope is given by
d(v{/A.) Nj + (n^iNj + ft + (21$ + (22^23' + (2^2]
1 + S'(v{) - [(v{ + 5(«/))/(l + S'(v{))}S"(v{) '
If we assume that \S"(v{)\ is not too large, the wage curve continues to be
upward-sloping in the Marshallian plane.
Comparing the wage curve under the graduated subsidy scheme in (33)
with (18) under the flat subsidy scheme, we notice that if the same dollar
amount is given under both schemes to an arbitrarily chosen type-z worker so
that sF = S(v{), the wage curve is shifted further down under the graduated
scheme on account of the term, [1 + S'(v{)], on the righthand side of (33).
This is because a graduated subsidy scheme induces firms to moderate wage
rates above the bottom to gain a larger subsidy. Thus, under the proviso
that the wage curve under a graduated subsidy scheme is not much steeper
than the corresponding wage curve under a flat subsidy scheme, there is a
further employment-creating effect present in a graduated scheme that is
not available in a flat subsidy scheme. Note that a wedge analysis is now
more complex since there is a shift of the wage curve in terms of (1 + r)v^
While the tax-graduated-subsidy scheme unambiguously expands equi-
librium employment, under what conditions will workers' take-home wages
(particularly, low-wage workers' wages) rise? To work toward obtaining the
answer, let us express (12) and (33) in the following respective implicit func-
tional forms:
(34) Nf = T(»/); T'(-) < 0
(35) N; = T(V; + ?}"'}); r'(-) > o.
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Around the equilibrium for a particular type-i worker,
(36) T(t?.-) = 1( 7-).
I t O/ ( I \
Let the size of the wage subsidy given to the particular type-z worker be
s* where s* = S(v{*), v{* being the wage paid by the firm to this particular
type-i worker. Around a zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, the response of v{ to
a small change in s* is given by
(37) ^ = ^ .
In view of (37), the necessary and sufficient condition for v{ + S(v{) to rise
is that
v(S"
For finite values of rjZP and 77IW, we see that this inequality is satisfied if
S" < 0 as well as — 1 < S' < 0. For the before-tax wage received by workers
not to fall, the scheme should not make the subsidy rise too rapidly as v{
is reduced and not make their decline accelerate as v{ is increased. These
conditions will prevent firms from lowering wage rates too far in order to
benefit from a larger subsidy.
Letting S = /^° S(v{)f(Ai)dAi, and using (37), we can show that around
a zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, the following derivative holds:
AmeJ{ds*hds* r = 0 7/IW -f- 7/ZP —
v - i — /
where dS/ds* > 0. So long as the subsidy does not rise too rapidly as v{ is
reduced, the above derivative is positive for a worker whose productivity is
sufficiently low. Moreover, by designing a subsidy plan such that the subsidy
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asymptotically reaches zero as v{ is increased (as in the illustrative graduated
plan shown below), we ensure that employment is raised throughout the
distribution although the expansionary effect is smaller at higher v{.
An illustrative graduated scheme is shown in Table 1 with S(v{) =
Aexp{ — b(v*)2} where A = 4.85 6 = 0.03. Under this scheme, a worker
earning $4 an hour receives a wage subsidy of $3 per hour while a worker
earning $10 per hour receives a subsidy of $0.24 per hour.
Hiring subsidy
Before concluding our analysis of the small open economy, let us examine the
effects of a hiring subsidy in our model. Suppose that an ad valorem payroll
tax is used to finance a flat hiring subsidy of sUF for each new recruit hired.
It is straightforward to show that our two fundamental equations giving the




(39) x[d(Ni, tf (r* - p, Nt))Ni + C2(JV,-, #(r* - p, Ni))*(r* - p, Nt)}.
In Figure 5, we show that the policy shifts up the ZP curve but shifts
down the IW curve leading to an unambiguous expansion of equilibrium
employment but possible decline of the product wage, v{. (In contrast, under
both the flat and graduated subsidy plans, the before-tax wage of the workers,
v{ + st-, unambiguously rises.) The take-home wage would accordingly fall
further as the payroll tax is applied. Moreover, the uncertainty regarding vf
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does not disappear as A,- —> A —> 0. This can be seen from the following
derivative16:
= (C
where /i, defined before, lies between zero and one.
III. Incidence in The Closed Economy
The essential task here is to endogenize the steady-state rate of interest. We
confine our analysis to a flat subsidy in the closed economy financed by a
proportional payroll tax.
For any particular r, our reduced-form ZP and IW curves are written
respectively as
vf(40) 1 - -L = /9[C(W, tf (r - p, Ni)) + r + 0]
A,- A,-
(41)
where we have again substituted/for yf jv^ the function #(r — /?, Ni) obtained
from the Blanchardian relationship expressed as
n
V / ' ' i i ( h I in\ AT '
We note from (40) and (41) that by equating the required incentive wage
to the demand wage, we can express the employment rate of any type-z
16The balanced budget condition with a hiring subsidy simplifies to r = [(£ +
0)snF/v^eia] around a zero-hiring-subsidy equilibrium, noting that in the steady-state,
the hiring rate equals ( + 9 for every type of worker.
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worker as an implicit function of the interest rate and the subsidy relative to
productivity level, namely,
(43) Nz=e(r-(sF/At)); £ l < 0; e2 > 0.
The function e is interpretable as the demand for the stock of employees in
steady state. The value of the total stock of employees, which are the only
form of asset in the closed economy, is A = f™ /3A{iV;/(A;)(iAt- since each
employee is worth /?A,-. By (43), A is a decreasing function of the rate of
interest:
(44) A = / At-/te(r; (57A t))/(A^A t .
For general equilibrium, the interest rate must equate the value of the
assets demanded to the quantity of wealth supplied. As before, an expres-
sion for the average supply of wealth per member of the type-z workforce is
obtained by substituting y? = (r + 0)Wi in (42):
Wi =
Excluding the case where r — p > 9, we have a well-defined steady state with
the righthand side of (45) being unambiguously positive. Observe that the
first bracketed term in (45) is simply human wealth per type-z worker, and
for a given expected after-tax real wage (^JVt), Hi is decreasing in r. On
this account, W{ falls as r rises. On the other hand, a rise of r has a positive
effect on W, on account of the second bracketed term, Wi/H{.
The total supply of wealth per worker is given by W = /^° Wi/(A,-)dAt-.
Using (45), we obtain
Assuming that the budget is balanced, we get
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Further using (40) and (43) in (47), we obtain an expression giving us total
desired supply of wealth as a function of the rate of interest:





Suppose that initially the flat subsidy and payroll tax rate are zero. In
that case, we note from (40) and (41) that setting sF = 0 implies that iVt- and
VT Irf a r e eclual across all types of workers. Consequently, the quit rate is
initially identical across all types of workers. What is the shape of the supply
of wealth curve in the absence of the tax-subsidy? There are two opposing
forces. In the general equilibrium, an increase of r lowers the real wage as
well as the probability of obtaining employment (as each N{ is reduced); and,
as remarked above, it lowers the present value of these expected earnings17.
So human wealth is reduced. However, the second bracketed term in (45)
works to increase desired supply of wealth as r rises. At r sufficiently low
that W{ is at or near zero, the former effects are outweighed by the latter
though at sufficiently high r the opposite may occur. Hence the per worker
supply of wealth schedule is upward-sloping initially but at very high r may
bend backward in Figure 6. In the same plane, per worker demand for the
domestic assets in value terms is downward sloping. In what follows we
suppose that the equilibrium r is unique or that only the lowest equilibrium
r is empirically relevant.
To see how the tax-subsidy policy affects the rate of interest, it will help
to have a sharper characterization of this equilibrium. Since the quit rate
17Although the increase of r leads directly to a decline in the real demand wage, the fall
in Ni acts to lower the quit propensity and hence indirectly acts to offset the fall in wage.
We assume that the direct effect dominates.
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is equal across all types of workers in the neighborhood of the zero-subsidy
equilibrium, we can simplify the equilibrium condition to
w = ( LZ1 ]
; - ) , tf (r - p,e(r; - ) ) ) + r + 9}} jf e(r; -)AJ(At)dAt
(49) = / AiPe{r; (sF/At))f(Az)dAt = A.
•'A
The equilibrium r is therefore given by




Thus we see that a tax-subsidy policy involving a small change in sF financed
by a proportional payroll tax has ultimately an influence on the interest
rate only via its influence on the quit rate. The effects of introducing a
small subsidy are as follows: At the original r, the subsidy, in expanding
the demand for employees of all types, shifts the domestic asset demand
schedule in Figure 6 to the right. (See the righthand side of (49).) As
workers, finding the probability of obtaining employment improved, step up
their saving accordingly, the supply of wealth schedule is also shifted to the
right. (See the lefthand side of (49).) In fact, both rightward shifts are equal
in magnitude, leaving the interest rate unchanged. But the rise in each TV,
acts in (49) to tighten the labor market of each type-z worker. The resulting
increase in the propensity to quit reduces the demand wage. This leads to
a leftward shift of the supply of wealth schedule causing the interest rate to
rise.18 (When the zero profit curve is horizontal, however, this effect would
18In the Appendix, we calculate the extent of the horizontal shifts of the total supply of
wealth and total asset demand schedules. When the labor cost elasticity of labor demand
is greater than one, the net shift of the total supply of wealth schedule is rightward. When
this elasticity is less than one, the net shift is leftward.
26
be zero.) But clearly this effect can only moderate the net expansionary
effect on employment of low-A; workers. To show this we may calculate the
total derivative of e(r,sF) evaluated at a low A,- with respect to sF.
Taking the total derivative in (49), we obtain
dL = (Ci + (2^2)^2
where Amean = f%° At/(A,)c?At is the mean productivity level. In the Ap-
pendix, we show that a necessary condition for the aggregate supply of wealth
schedule to be positively sloped under the proviso that the labor-cost elastic-
ity of labor demand exceeds unity is that [9(9 + p)/'(r — p)2] > C2^i-19 Hence
the tax-subsidy scheme raises the rate of interest. To prove that for low-At-
workers, the rise of r only moderates but does not overturn the expansionary
employment effect of sF, we calculate the following derivative:
dr e2
dsF iKdsFj A,
^ / rr6(6-i-n\ >. .-r. i / J. J. .-w
In the homogeneous case, the tax-subsidy scheme unambiguously expands
employment for everyone. In the heterogeneous case, all workers whose A,
is either below or equal to the mean must find their employment expanded.
It is straightforward to obtain an expression for the derivative of v\ with
respect to sF:
A,- . ^ r /> .. _ .dNi M T dr
i - A , / 3 [ ( C + C * ) ^ + C »} i = u mean «S* OS
19The inequality could (but need not necessarily) be reversed when the labor cost elastic-
ity of labor demand is less than one. If the inequality is reversed but the aggregate supply
of wealth schedule remains positively sloped, there is an increased upward pressure on
the interest rate. If the inequality is reversed and the aggregate supply of wealth becomes
negatively sloped, there is the theoretical possibility that the rate of interest is lowered as a
result of the tax-subsidy scheme. In such a case, employment is unambiguously expanded
for workers of all types.
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We see that for a worker whose At is sufficiently low, his v!f will rise as well.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The pay open to the less advantaged is now so inadequate for meaningful self-
support and their participation rates and job attachment, especially among
men, are now so far from integrating poor communities in the nation's busi-
ness life that, arguably, any remedy will require novel intervention. (If the
goal is now far, just raising the level of familiar instruments may suffice to
reattain it, but if the goal is far, designing de nuovo a more tailored instru-
ment may be cheaper.) Any such innovation, however, may obey the law of
unintended consequences, since we do not know the scale and perhaps the
nature of all the effects. This uncertainty leads to hesitation and disagree-
ment over the intervention to select. An investment in education that would
hypothetically restore low-end wages to their late-1970s level has been cal-
culated to cost nearly two trillion dollars (Heckman, 1993). But the radical
uncertainty over exactly what education reforms and expenditures to make
may be a bigger drawback (along with the needed one-generation lead-time).
The employment subsidy instrument has the advantage that economists
are familiar with the workings of corrective taxes and subsidies—but mainly
at the partial-equilibrium level of the individual industry. Massive and per-
haps permanent low-wage employment subsidies would not likely prove an
exception to the law of unanticipated effects. This paper has been addressed
to the doubts over such subsidies that might arise at the level of general
equilibrium. Is it theoretically possible in the context of our model of the
natural rate that the rise of the wage rate relative to nonwage income initially
achieved by the subsidies—recall that the increased payroll tax rate is ulti-
mately neutral for that ratio—will induce worker-savers to build up nonwage
income relative to the wage rate until incentive wages have been driven up
and the demand-wage rate driven down by enough to nullify the expansion of
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employment? As the paper has shown, the adjustment of wealth in the small
open economy does act to moderate the expansion of employment achieved
by the subsidies in the "short run" but in the long run employment is in-
creased throughout the distribution. In the closed-economy case, the interest
rate is pulled up, which moderates employment expansion. Nevertheless, em-
ployment unambiguously expands for all workers whose productivity level is
below the mean.
Other uncertainties must be left for future work. One of these, obvi-
ously, is the net budgetary cost of wage subsidies. In principle, employment
subsidies could be targeted on groups who, if their employment were not
subsidized, would otherwise cost the government as much or more in public
support—single parent, generally mothers, with dependent children, for ex-
ample. In America, however, it may be the increased difficulty of self-support
and the increased disengagement from business life among men that is fun-
damental, since that may lie behind the rise of single-parenting as well as the
rise of crime, violence and drug abuse. And men are not as eligible as women
for most welfare outlays. So employment subsidies had better be untargeted.
And the argument that their net budgetary cost will be small enough to sat-
isfy taxpayers has to rest on estimates of the indirect savings and revenues
achieved when entire poor communities are made self-supporting through
work: the savings in welfare, crime prevention, administration of justice,
unemployment compensation and other social insurance programs (under
existing benefit schedules), and the revenues from the additional collection
of income and sales taxes (under existing rates).
An attractive feature of hiring subsidies is that they can be targeted at
those potential workers currently depending on unemployment compensation
or welfare benefits for their support. So the budgetary savings achieved by
stimulating their employment may equal or exceed the gross budgetary outlay
for the subsidies. This feature has been used by Dennis Snower in designing
a program whereby the unemployed worker creates his own hiring subsidy
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by trading in his unemployment benefits in return for a job. We found,
however, that subsidies to hiring might actually reduce wage rates at the low
end, perhaps, appreciably so, and this would be a serious drawback in the
American context where, among the disadvantaged, low wages are as much in
need of remedying as depressed employment. Furthermore, jobless American
men receive little in entitlements that they could exchange for a job other
than their unemployment compensation and those benefits are not long-term
and not broad-based.
Uncertainty also hangs over the amount of abuse and fraud that wage
subsidy programs would lead to. Hiring subsidies would apparently invite
employers to swap employees, perhaps after the spell of unemployment re-
quired for eligibility, and to move employees more freely from corporation
to corporation under the same parent company—all in order to collect in-
creased hiring subsidies. An advantage of the employment subsidies studied
here is that they would not encourage those abuses. However, employment
subsidies (and possibly hiring subsidies too) would inspire firms, especially
single-proprietor firms, to featherbed the payroll with phantom employees
under the names of persons, such as family members, whose silence would be
trusted. On balance, it might be advantageous for this as well as other reasons
to restrict the subsidies to full-time jobs, to good-sized firms where whistle-
blowers would be a deterrent, and to limit the subsidies to credits against the
firms' tax liabilities. In another sort of abuse, the employer and employee
would agree to a reduced wage, which would add to the subsidy earned, and
a compensating increase in nonwage benefits, which, if undetected or not
counted as compensation, would not add to the subsidy earned. For this
reason, a graduated subsidy must decrease slowly with the wage rate so that
this temptation is not too strong in relation to the monitoring powers of the
tax authorities. Yet another abuse would draw upon the collusion of third
parties. To earn increased employment subsidies an employer might reduce
the wage rate of employees and compensate them with side jobs above their
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normal pay rates at a cooperating firm, which might do the same with the
first firm or with other firms. Similiarly, under the existing Earned Income
Tax Credit program awarding subsidies directly to the taxpayer reporting low
earnings, the wage can be reduced and the employee compensated through
special discounts obtained from third parties. It may be, however, that such
abuses could be deterred by punishing them with the same severity meted
out to other kinds of tax fraud.
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Appendix
1. The vertical shifts of the iso-y™ ZP and iso-y™ IW curves in response to a





2. To prove that at given r, the tax subsidy policy shifts the aggregate supply
of wealth schedule to the right, we express (48) as W = D(r, sF). Taking a
total derivative through (48) with respect to sF we obtain
where R = (r — /?)/[(9 -\- p — r)(r + 0)]. The assumption that the labor-cost
elasticity of labor demand exceeds one implies that the reduced-form ZP
curve cuts the hyperbola from below in the JVf-—(u//A,-) plane. The slope of
the hyperbola is given by —(vj/A^N'1, which equals —[1 — /?(C-|-r+ 0)]7V~1
around the equilibrium while the slope of the reduced-form ZP curve is given
by -/?(& + C2tf2). Hence,
[1 - /?(C + r + 0)] > /?(Ci + C2*2)£-
Accordingly, ^2 > 0.
From (44), we can express total asset demand as A — O(r,sF). We can
obtain the following derivative:
O2 = fe,
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which is positive. Noting (50), it is clear that 0 2 >
3. It is straightforward to show that
(r - /))^
Noting (50), the condition
[1 - 0(C + r + 0)] >
can be re-expressed as
Thus for (7i to be positive, it is required that
Hence a necessary condition for the aggregate supply of wealth curve to be
positively sloped when the labor-cost elasticity of labor demand exceeds one
is that [0(e + p)/(r-p)2)>(2y1.
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Table 1
f\2iTable of Wage Subsidy Schedule: s = A exp(-b(v r)
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